中山大学学报社会科学版 ›› 2008, Vol. 48 ›› Issue (1): 102-111.

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胡塞尔早期内时间意识分析的基本进路

倪梁康   

  • 收稿日期:2007-10-21 修回日期:1900-01-01 出版日期:2008-01-15 发布日期:2008-01-15

Elements of Husserls Early Analysis of the Internal Timeconsciousness

NI Liangkang   

  1. (Institute of Phenomenology, Sun Yatsen University, Guangzhou, 510275)
  • Received:2007-10-21 Revised:1900-01-01 Online:2008-01-15 Published:2008-01-15

摘要:

虽然我们的意识千变万化、流动不息,但仍然具有一个稳定的纵意向和横意向结构。也正是因为我们意识的流动性和时间性,我们才能够觉知时间化的感觉内容以及感觉内容的时间化,并进一步将这些时间化的内容立义为时间客体,再进一步感知到这些客体的时间性,最终可以把时间本身当作客体,即构造出客观时间。这是胡塞尔时间意识分析的一个基本思路和基本结论。在这个分析的基础上可以解释,为什么内时间意识是客观时间产生的前提。

关键词: 纵意向性, 内时间意识, 内在时间, 客观时间

Abstract:

Although the consciousness is ever changing, flowing without rest, yet it still has a stable vertical intentional and horizontal intentional structure. Just because of the fluidity and timeliness of the consciousness, one can be aware of the temporalized feelingcontent as well as the temporalizing of feelingcontent, and further apprehend these time contents as time object, again further percept the temporality of these objects. Finally one can regard the time itself as an object, that is to say one can constitute the objective time. This is an elemental train of thoughts and a basic conclusion of Husserls timeconsciousness analysis. Based on his analysis we can explain why internal timeconsciousness is a premise for the generation of the objective time.

Key words: horizontal intentionality, consciousness of internal time, immanent time, objective time

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