中山大学学报社会科学版 ›› 2008, Vol. 48 ›› Issue (1): 135-141.

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集群经济中的关系合约与稳定性机制研究

王珺   

  • 收稿日期:2007-11-20 修回日期:1900-01-01 出版日期:2008-01-15 发布日期:2008-01-15

On Relationship Contract and Stability Mechanism in Cluster Economy

WANG Jun   

  1. (Lingnan College, Sun Yatsen University, Guangzhou, 510275)
  • Received:2007-11-20 Revised:1900-01-01 Online:2008-01-15 Published:2008-01-15

摘要:

威廉姆森的治理模型提出了混合状态下关系合约治理具有不稳定性的观点。该文认为,这种观点是有条件的。这个前提条件是混合状态下的退出成本。文章以集群经济为研究对象,重点考察企业的固定与沉淀成本和劳动力的流动成本作为退出成本对集群稳定性的影响。如果这两种成本较低,那么,关系合约治理就会呈现不稳定特征。如果退出成本较高,关系合约就具有一定的稳定性,进而这种治理也会相对有效。文章以集群作为一种混合状态下的组织形式,论述了退出成本的构成及其对关系合约的治理影响。

关键词: 关系合约, 退出成本, 稳定性机制, 集群经济

Abstract:

Williamsons governance model proposes that relationship contract under the hybrid status is provided with instability. This paper, however, argues that this argument is preconditional, whose premise is the exit cost under hybrid status. Focusing on the cluster, this paper observes the effects of exit cost on the stability of cluster composed of enterprises fixed and sunk cost and labors flowing cost. If both costs are relatively low, the relationship contract governance shall come with the feature of instability. While with high exit cost, the relationship contract shall be of stability in some way, hence the relatively effective governance. Taking cluster as a kind of organization form of hybrid status, it analyzes the composition of exit cost and its influence on the governance of relationship contract.

Key words: relationship contract, exit cost, stability mechanism

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